Abstract. Consistency-based approaches in nonmonotonic reasoning may be expected to yield multiple sets of default conclusions for a given default theory. Reasoning about such extensions is carried out at the meta-level. In this paper, we show how such reasoning may be carried out at the object level for a large class of default theories. Essentially we show how one can translate a (semi-monotonic) default theory ∆, obtaining a second ∆ ′ , such that ∆ ′ has a single extension that encodes every extension of ∆. Moreover, our translated theory is only a constant factor larger than the original (with the exception of unique names axioms). We prove that our translation behaves correctly. In the approach we can now encode the notion of extension from within the framework of standard default logic. Hence one can encode notions such as skeptical and credulous conclusions, and can reason about such conclusions within a single extension. This result has some theoretical interest, in that it shows how multiple extensions of semi-monotonic default theories are encodable with manageable overhead in a single extension. default logic, skeptical reasoning, credulous reasoning, tagging
Introduction
In nonmonotonic reasoning, in so-called consistency-based approaches such as default logic [9] and autoepistemic logic [6] , one typically obtains not just a single set of default conclusions, but rather multiple sets of candidate default conclusions. Consider the by-now hackneyed example wherein Quakers are normally pacifist, Republicans are normally not, along with adults are normally employed. Assume as well that someone is a Quaker, Republican, and an adult. In default logic (see Section 2) this can be encoded by: ({ Q : P P , P ) is called a credulous (or brave) default conclusion, while one that appears in every extension (such as E) is called a skeptical conclusion. Intuitively it might seem that skeptical inference is the more useful notion. However, this is not necessarily the case. In diagnosis from first principles [10] for example, in one encoding there is a 1-1 correspondence between diagnoses and extensions of the (encoding) semi-monotonic default theory. Hence one may want to carry out further reasoning to determine which diagnosis to pursue. More generally there may be reasons to prefer some extensions over others, or to somehow synthesize the information found in several extensions.
In this paper, we show how such reasoning can be carried out at the object level. For a default theory ∆ = (D, W ), we translate ∆ to obtain a second theory ∆ ′ = (D ′ , W ′ ), such that ∆ ′ has a single extension that encodes every extension of ∆. Given this, one can express in the theory what it means for something to be a skeptical or credulous default conclusion. Our result isn't completely general; however it applies to semi-monotonic default theories. The translation has several desirable properties. The translated theory ∆ ′ is only a constant factor larger than the original ∆, with the exception of introduced unique names axioms. As well, we prove that our translation behaves correctly.
We first show for a set of defaults Dm how, using an encoding, we can detect the case wherein all defaults in Dm apply. From this, for a default theory (D ∪ Dm, W ) we show how to obtain a second theory wherein (informally) either all of the defaults in Dm are applied en masse (if possible) or none of them are. This is done by naming each of the defaults in Dm, and then expressing in default logic the applicability conditions for the defaults. We develop this in Section 3. In Section 4 we present our main result, where we show how a default theory can be translated into a second theory whose extension encodes the extensions of the original. Roughly we provide an axiomatisation that "locates" maximal sets of applicable defaults; for such a set, the set of default conclusions is "tagged" with the set name, to distinguish it from other instances. For example, in our original example, let m1,3 be the name of the set { Q : P P ,
A : E E } and m2,3 be the name of {
Default Logic
Default logic [9] augments classical logic by default rules of the form α : β γ . A default rule is normal if β is equivalent to γ; it is semi-normal if β implies γ. We sometimes denote the prerequisite α of a default δ by PRE(δ), its justification β by JUS(δ), and its consequent γ by CON(δ). Accordingly, PRE(D) is the set of prerequisites of all defaults in D; JUS(D) and CON(D) are defined analogously. Empty components, such as no prerequisite or even no justifications, are assumed to be tautological. Semantically, defaults with unbound variables are taken to stand for all corresponding instances. A set of default rules D and a set of formulas W form a default theory (D, W ) that may induce a single or multiple extensions in the following way [9] . Definition 1. Let (D, W ) be a default theory and let E be a set of formulas. Define E0 = W and for i ≥ 0: GDi = α : β 1 ,...,βn γ ∈ D α ∈ Ei, ¬β1 ∈ E, . . . , ¬βn ∈ E Ei+1 = Th(Ei) ∪ {CON(δ) | δ ∈ GDi}
Then E is an extension for (D,
Ei. Any such extension represents a possible set of beliefs about the world at hand. Further, define for a set of formulas S and a set of defaults D, the set of generating default rules as GD(D, S) = {δ ∈ D | PRE(δ) ∈ S and ¬JUS(δ) ∈ S} . An enumeration δi i∈I of default rules is grounded in a set of formulas W , if we have for every i ∈ I that W ∪CON({δ0, . . . , δi−1}) ⊢ PRE(δi). A default theory (D, W ) is said to be semi-monotonic if, for
′ is an extension of D ′ then there is an extension E ′′ of D ′′ where E ′ ⊆ E ′′ .
3 Applying All, or None, of a Set of Defaults
In this section we consider the problem of how to apply all defaults in some set, or none in the set. We will thus work with default theories (D, W ) having some distinguished finite subset Dm ⊆ D. For making the set Dm explicit, we denote such theories by (D∪Dm, W ). The idea is that we wish to obtain extensions of (D ∪ Dm, W ) subject to the constraint that all defaults in Dm are applied, or none are. For example, in the theory
, ∅ we would want to obtain an extension containing A, but not B (since both defaults in , {∅} we would want to obtain an extension containing A, B, and D. We begin by associating a unique name with each default. This is done by extending the original language by a set of constants 1 N such that there is a bijective mapping n : D → N . We write n δ instead of n(δ) (and we often abbreviate n δ i by ni to ease notation). Also, for default δ along with its name n, we sometimes write n : δ to render naming explicit. To encode the fact that we deal with a finite set of distinct default rules, we adopt a unique names assertion (UNAN ) and domain closure assertion (DCAN ) with respect to N . So, for a name set N = {n1, . . . , n k }, we add axioms
We write ∀x ∈ N. P (x) for ∀x. name(x) ⊃ P (x).
We introduce a new constant m as the name of the designated rule set Dm. We relate the name of the rule set denoted by m with the names of its members by introducing a binary predicate in where in(x, y) is true just if the default named by x is a member of the set named by y. In this section, instances of in will be of the form in(·, m). While we could get away with not using in (and m) here, this additional machinery is required in Section 4, and it is most straightforward to introduce it here. Note that we do not need a full axiomatization of in, representing set membership, since we use it in a very restricted fashion.
For applying all, or none, of the defaults in Dm, we need to be able to, first, detect when a rule has been applied or is blocked and, second, control the application of a rule based on other prerequisite conditions. There are two cases for a default
to not be applied: the prerequisite is not known to be true (and so its negation ¬α is consistent), or the justification is not consistent (and so its negation ¬β is derivable). For detecting this case, we introduce a new, special-purpose predicate bl/1. Similarly we introduce a special-purpose predicate ap/1 to detect when a rule has been applied. For controlling application of a rule we introduce predicates ok/1 and ko/1.
We are given a default theory (D ∪ Dm, W ) over language L and its set of associated default names N∪{m}.
2 Let Dm = nj :
(For simplicity, we reuse the symbols j, k, m, nj, αj , etc. below.) We de-
* with new predicates symbols ok/1, ko/1, bl/1, ap/1, and names N∪{m}, as follows
Clearly, DN contains the images of the original rules in Dm. Each rule δj ∈ DN is applicable, if ok(nj ) is derivable. In fact, we assert ok(nj ) for every δj ∈ Dm, unless we cannot jointly apply all rules of Dm. That is, before activating the constituent rules, we have to make sure that none of them will be blocked. This is accomplished through the justification ¬ko(m) in (2) together with Axiom (5). We block rule (2) (and with it the derivability of all ok(nj )) when we detect that one of δ1, . . . , δ k is blocked. That is, ko(m) will be an immediate consequence of bl(m). Now, we have that Dm is blocked (bl(m)) just if some rule in Dm is blocked. However, since we must control a whole set of defaults, we must check for the blockage of one of the constituent default rules in the context of all other rules in the set applying. For detecting the failure of consistency, we verify for Dm and some set of formulas S (cf. Definition 1), whether S ∪ {γ1, . . . , γ k } ⊢ ¬βj rather than S ⊢ ¬βj . This motivates the prerequisite of the second rule in (3). This context, (γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γ k ), is not needed for detecting the failure of derivability by means of the first rule in (3) , since this test is effectuated with respect to the final extension E via ¬αj ∈ E. Finally, as given in (6) , Dm is applied (ap(m)) just if every rule in Dm is applied; it is only in this last case that the consequents of the constituent rules in Dm are asserted. Consider theory (D ∪ Dm, W ), where
, Dm = n1 :
: P P , n2 :
: S S .
For DN and DM , we obtain (after simplifying and removing redundant defaults):
.
The in predicate has instances: in(n1, m) and in(n2, m).
We obtain two extensions, one containing P, S, ¬E and the other containing E, ¬(P ∧ S). For the first case, we obtain ok(n1) and ok(n2). If both δ1 and δ2 are applicable (which they are) then we conclude P ∧ ap(n1) and S ∧ ap(n1) as well as ap(m). From this we get P and S and so ¬E. For the other extensions, if the default : E E is applied, then ¬P ∨ ¬S is derivable, and so
is applicable, from which we obtain bl(m), and so ko(m), blocking application of
. Consequently neither
can be applied.
In the next example, defaults inside a set depend upon each other. Consider (∅ ∪ Dm, ∅) with Dm = n1 :
: Q Q , n2 :
We get for DN and DM the following rules.
We obtain ok(n1), and ok(n2), which allow us to apply default δ1, yielding in turn Q ∧ ap(n1). Given Q, we can now apply default δ2, yielding R ∧ ap(n2). From this we deduce ap(m). We thus get an extension containing Q and R. This example also shows why we cannot avoid the translation by replacing Dm by
. As well, in Section 4, this replacement would result in an exponential blowup in the encoding. The next theorem summarizes properties of our approach, and shows that rules are applied either en masse, or not at all.
Theorem 2. For default theory (∅∪D, W ), we have that Sm((∅∪D, W )) has extension E where either
The default theory ∅ ∪
: B ¬B
, ∅ has an extension E where E ∩ L = Th(∅). 
Encoding extensions using sets
For encoding extensions of a semi-monotonic default theory (D, W ), we use the machinery developed in the previous section to determine maximal (with respect to set inclusion) sets of applicable defaults. Names are introduced for each subset of D, and for each instance of a rule in each subset of D. As well, new predicate symbols are introduced to further control application of sets of rules. We then give a translation that yields a second default theory (D ′ , W ′ ). Viewed algorithmically, this second theory carries out the following: If the original set of defaults D constitutes the set of generating defaults of an extension, then a corresponding "ap"-literal is derived; all default consequences are obtained; and all subsets of the defaults are rendered inapplicable. If this isn't the case (and D isn't a set of generating defaults), we proceed along the partial order induced by set inclusion and consider every set D \ {δ} for every δ ∈ D to see whether it is a set of generating defaults. Crucially, default conclusions are "tagged" with the name of the set in which they appear so as to eliminate possible side effects. To name sets of defaults, we take some fixed enumeration n1, . . . , n k of N , and define m as a k-ary function symbol. Then, for n ⊥ ∈ N , define
Intuitively, xi = n ⊥ tells us that ni does not belong to the set at hand. Accordingly, for x = x1..x k and
The advantage of this "vector-oriented" representation over a dynamic one including a binary function symbol (as with lists) is that each set has a unique representation. We write ∀x ∈ M. P (x) instead of ∀x. set-name(x) ⊃ P (x). Further, we use M for denoting the set of all valid set-names, that is,
In order to ease notation, we write m1,3 instead of m(n1, n ⊥ , n3, n ⊥ , . . . , n ⊥ ) when representing the set {δ1, δ3}. Also, we abbreviate m(n ⊥ , . . . , n ⊥ ) by m ∅ and m(n1, . . . , n k ) by mD. Note the difference between names ni and mi, induced by our notational convention. We also rely on the "vector-oriented" representation for capturing set membership, denoted by in/2. Consider for instance N = {n1, n2}. Membership is then axiomatized through the formulas
While this validates in(n1, m1,2), it falsifies in(n1, m2). See (15) for the general case. We need to be able to refer to separate instances of the same default appearing in different sets. For this we introduce a function-symbol ·/2. For δj ∈ Di we write n δ j ·mi or nj ·mi to name the instance of δj appearing in Di. This results in name set N ·M = {n·m | n ∈ N, m ∈ M }. Corresponding axioms, as DCAN·M and UNAN·M , are obtained in a straightforward way. In what follows, we refer to the various domain closure and unique names axioms pertaining to N , M , and N ·M as Ax(N ).
by replacing all predicate symbols in γ with predicate symbols extended as described, and with term m as the (i + 1) st argument. This extra argument is used to index formulas by the (names of) sets in which they are used. Lastly, we introduce special-purpose predicates for controlling the application of sets of defaults. These are summarised in the following table:
It is ok to try to apply set/rule e ap(e) Set/rule e is applied bl(m) Not all rules in set m can be applied ovr(m) Some set named m ′ is applied and m < m
Taking all this into account, we obtain the following translation, mapping default theories in language L onto default theories in the language L + obtained by unioning all languages L(m) for m ∈ M and using the aforementioned names and introduced predicates and functions:
where
The rules in DN and DM directly generalise those in (1-3), from treating a single set named m to an arbitrary set referenced by variable x. The specific consequents used in the second rule in (3) are dealt with via the axioms in (WD/14) that allows us to quantify over default consequents (via predicate c). This trick avoids the exponential blowup that would occur in (11) if we were to explicitly give the consequences of the rules. The rules in (D¬/12) provide us with complete knowledge on predicates < and in. The axioms in (WW /13) propagate the information in W to all possible contexts. WM takes care of what we need wrt set operations. That is, (15) formalises set membership, while (16) formalises strict set inclusion. W< axiomatises the control flow along the partial order induced by <. Axioms (17) and (18) tell us when it is ok to consider a certain set: we always consider the maximum set D; otherwise, via (18), we consider a set just when every superset is known to be blocked (and so inapplicable). (19) tells us when the consideration of a set is cancelled. This either happens because a set is inapplicable (given by bl) or because it has been explicitly cancelled (given by ovr). (20) asserts that a set is applied just if all of its member rules are. Once we have found an applicable set of rules (and hence a set of generating defaults) we need not consider any subset; (21) annuls the consideration of all such subsets. For example, consider the following normal default theory:
: A A , n2 :
, n3 :
: ¬B ¬B , n4 :
From E (∆22) we get an extension, where the only "ap-literals" are ap(m1,2,4) and ap(m1,3). That is, ∆22 has two extensions with generating defaults, the first with δ1, δ2, δ4, and the second with δ1, δ3. Among formulas in the extension of E (∆22) are A(m1,2,4), A(m1,3), B(m1,2,4), ¬B(m1,3), and D(m1,2,4). To see this, let us take a closer look at the image of ∆22, namely E (∆22). For DN , we get
We get a single nontrivial rule in (10), namely
and four rules in (11)
Given ok(mD), we may consider any rule in DM . However, given that ∀y ∈ N. in(y, mD) is true, we obtain that (14) and ∀y ∈ N. in(y, mD) ⊃ c(y, mD) are inconsistent and thus imply any formula. Consequently, rules (26) to (29) are applicable and provide bl(mD), yielding ko(mD), which in turn blocks (9) for x = mD. From (16), we obtain (among other relations) m1,2,3 < mD, m1,2,4 < mD, m1,3,4 < mD, and m2,3,4 < mD.
From (18), we then get ok(m1,2,3), ok(m1,2,4), ok(m1,3,4), and ok(m2,3,4). Now, consider ok(m1,2,4). From (9), we obtain ∀y ∈ N. in(y, m1,2,4) ⊃ ok(y·m1,2,4)
yielding ok(n1·m1,2,4), ok(n2·m1,2,4), and ok(n4·m1,2,4). This allows us to apply three of the four rules in (23/24) and we obtain A(m1,2,4) ∧ ap(n1·m1,2,4), B(m1,2,4) ∧ ap(n2·m1,2,4), and D(m1,2,4) ∧ ap(n4·m1,2,4).
From (20), we obtain ap(m1,2,4), from which we deduce with (21) in turn ovr(m1,2,4), ovr(m2,4), . . . , ovr(m4), and ovr(m ∅ ). Next, consider ok(m1,2,3). As with ok(mD), we obtain an inconsistency among in(n1, m1,2,3), in(n2, m1,2,3), in(n3, m1,2,3), ∀y ∈ N. in(y, m1,2,3) ⊃ c(y, m1,2,3), and (14). This validates the prerequisites of rules (26), (27), and (28), thus yielding bl(m1,2,3). As above, we then get from WM that ok(m1,2), ok(m1,3), ok(m2,3). Note that we have already obtained ovr(m1,2) from ap(m1,2,4). Given ok(m1,3), (9) provides us with ok(n1·m1,3) and ok(n3·m1,3). Using the two first rules in (23/24), we get A(m1,3) ∧ ap(n1·m1,3) and ¬B(m1,3) ∧ ap(n3·m1,3). From (20), we then get ap(m1,3), from which we deduce with (21) in turn ovr(m1), ovr(m3), and ovr(m ∅ ) (again). Given ok(m2,3), along with the fact that in(n2, m2,3), in(n3, m2,3), ∀y ∈ N. in(y, m2,3) ⊃ c(y, m2,3), and (14) imply B(m2,3) and ¬B(m2,3), Rule (27) and (28) fire and we get bl(m2,3).
The next results show that our default theories resulting from E have appropriate properties.
The next two theorems show that our translation captures an encoding of extensions of a semi-monotonic default theory.
Theorem 6. Let (D, W ) be a semi-monotonic default theory and let E be the extension of E ((D, W )). Then for any ap(m) ∈ E with m ∈ M , we have that Th({γ | γ(m) ∈ E}) is an extension of (D, W ).
Theorem 7. Let (D, W ) be a semi-monotonic default theory with extensions E1, ..., En and let E be the extension of E ((D, W )). Then, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is some m ∈ M naming GD(D, Ei) such that ap(m) ∈ E.
Lastly, our claim that a translated theory is a constant factor larger than the original requires a caveat. UNAN yields a quadratic number of unique names assertions. In practice this is no problem, since any sensible implementation would not explicitly list such axioms. With the exception of unique names assertions, a translated theory is a constant factor larger than the original. To see this, it suffices to examine Definition 2. Each of (8, 10, 11, 14, 15) introduce |D| axioms/rules; (13) introduces |W | axioms. All remaining terms introduce a single axiom. Moreover, the size of individual axioms is similarly bounded. (For example, each instance of (8) is a constant factor larger than the original default.)
Discussion
We have shown how we can encode a semi-monotonic default theory so that the extension from the encoding represents all extensions of the original theory. The fact that we encode all extensions of a theory within a single extension means that we can now encode phenomena of interest, usually dealt with at the metalevel, at the object level. Specifically we can now encode the notions of skeptical and credulous inference within a theory. In order to do this, we introduce two new constants skep and cred, for "skeptical" and "credulous" respectively. A formula is a skeptical inference if it is a member of every extension. In our approach, this means that it follows in every "ap-set". Hence we define skeptical inference within a theory, for a given formula γ, by
For credulous inference, the simplest option is to assert that a formula is a credulous inference if it is a member of some extension:
However, this is overly simplistic, since with this definition, a formula and its negation may be credulous inferences. A more reasonable definition is to assert that a formula is a credulous inference if it is a member of some extension, and its negation is a member of no extension. We can define this notion of credulous inference (indicated by cred ′ ) for a formula γ by means of the default:
Hence in Example (22), we obtain that A is a skeptical inference, while D is a cred ′ ulous inference. B and ¬B are credulous inferences. We have suggested that the approach may be applicable in diagnosis programs, such as found in [10] . Similarly, the approach can be used to directly encode applications expressible in Theorist [8] . That is, there is a correspondence between so-called Poole-type theories and Theorist with constraints [3] . Since Poole-type theories are semi-monotonic, this means that our approach can encode any application encodable in Theorist. Our approach relies on a first-order language. Despite this, the image of a theory over a finite language remains finite. As regards implementation, however, it is not advisable to use a bottom-up grounding approach, as done in many implementations of extended logic programming [4, 7] . Instead, a query-oriented approach seems to be advantageous, because it may rely on unification rather than ground instantiation. In Definition 2, sets of defaults were ordered based on the partial order given by set containment. This order represents one example of a preference order on sets of defaults. A natural avenue for future work would be to generalise our approach to address arbitrary preference orders on sets of defaults. In an arbitrary preference order on sets, one could represent desiderata as found in configuration, scheduling, or (generally) decisiontheoretic problems. This could also be combined with the present approach yielding an encoding of preferences on extensions. Hence, for our diagnosis example, we might want to prefer extensions (diagnoses) on the basis of an ordering based on reliability of components.
Conclusion
We have described an approach for encoding default extensions within a single extension. Using constants and functions for naming, we can refer to default rules, sets of defaults, and instances of a rule in a set. Via these names we can, first, determine whether a set of defaults is its own set of generating defaults and, second, consider the application of sets of defaults ordered by set containment. The translated theory requires a modest increase in space: except for unique names axioms, only a constant-factor increase is needed. The translated theory is a (regular, Reiter) default theory. Hence we essentially axiomatise the notion of "extensions" for the class of semi-monotonic default theories, resulting in a single extension. Further, we are able to prove that our translation behaves correctly. Using the approach we can now express notions such as skeptical and credulous inference within a theory. Arguably this will prove beneficial in expressing at the object level problems and approaches generally expressed at the metalevel. Areas of application range from specific areas such as diagnosis, to broadly-applicable approaches such as Theorist. Lastly, we suggest that the approach may be easily extended to address arbitrary preferences over sets of defaults.
A Proofs of Theorems

A.1 Proofs for Section 3
The following definition is used in the proofs.
Definition 3 ([9]
). Let (D, W ) be a default theory. For any set of formulas S, let Γ (S) be the smallest set of formulas S ′ such that
With respect to the various translations we adopt the following notation: For a set of defaults with name m and one of its members with name n, let δ 1. if part Suppose ap(n δ ) ∈ E for all δ ∈ Dm. Since E is deductively closed and since E contains Formula (6), we deduce that ap(m) ∈ E. only-if part Suppose ap(m) ∈ E. By construction, this implies ap(n δ ) ∈ E for all δ such that in(n δ , m) ∈ E, or δ ∈ Dm. By the definition of DN and WD, however, we have ap(n δ ) ∈ E only if CON(δ) ∧ ap(n δ ) ∈ E. Since this holds for all δ ∈ Dm, we obtain {ap(
. Then, one of the following cases must be true.
-If ¬JUS(δ) ∈ E, then clearly from WD we get CON(δ1) ∧ · · · ∧ CON(δ k ) ⊃ ¬JUS(δ) ∈ E, where {δ1, . . . , δ k } = Dm. By Theorem 1.3 and the fact that E is deductively closed, we get that
we may distinguish the following cases.
• Assume PRE(δ) ∈ E. Consequently, δ
• If ok(n δ ) ∈ E, then δ m a ∈ GD(D ′ , E), since this is the only means by which we can fail to obtain ok(n δ ) ∈ E. Hence ovr(m) ∈ E; hence from (5) we get bl(m) ∈ E. Thus, in all cases we obtain that bl(m) ∈ E. only-if part Suppose bl(m) ∈ E. We distinguish the following two cases.
, then we have that PRE(δj) ∈ E for some δj ∈ Dm. Therefore, (δj )
, then we have for some δj ∈ {δ1, . . . , δ k } = Dm that
Assume {ap(n δ ) | δ ∈ Dm} ⊆ E, that is, by definition of DN that {CON(δ) ∧ ap(n δ ) | δ ∈ Dm} ⊆ E. Since E is deductively closed we get from (30) that ¬JUS(δj ) ∈ E and therefore (δj) m,n j a ∈ GD(D ′ , E) and clearly ap(nj ) ∈ E, a contradiction. In both cases we thus obtain {ap(n δ ) | δ ∈ Dm} ⊆ E. 3. if part Suppose ap(n δ ) ∈ E. Then we have necessarily that δ m,n δ a ∈ GD(D ′ , E), and therefore that PRE(δ) ∧ ok(n δ ) ∈ E, and so ok(n δ ) ∈ E. only-if part Suppose ok(n δ ) ∈ E. Then, we have by definition of DM that
Clearly, we thus have ovr(m) ∈ E; this implies bl(m) ∈ E. As a consequence, we get δ
. We obtain for each δ ∈ {δ1, . . . , δ k } = Dm that
Furthermore, the latter gives ¬JUS(δ) ∈ E. With ok(n1) ∧ · · · ∧ ok(n δ ) ∧ · · · ∧ ok(n k ) ∈ E and the fact that E is deductively closed, we get that δ m,n δ a ∈ GD(D ′ , E) for all δ ∈ Dm. That is, since E is deductively closed, ap(n δ ) ∈ E for all δ ∈ Dm. 4. if part Suppose ovr(m) ∈ E, and so bl(m) ∈ E. As a consequence, we get δ
∈ GD(D ′ , E) for some δ ∈ Dm. As a corollary of Theorem 1.1-2, we ob-
The if-part is trivial.
For the only-if part, assume that ap(n δ ) ∈ E for some δ ∈ Dm. Then δ m,n δ a ∈ GD(D ′ , E) and therefore δ m a ∈ GD(D ′ , E). We also have in(n δ , m) ∈ E for all δ ∈ Dm. Further, δ m a ∈ GD(D ′ , E) implies ok(n δ ) ∈ E for all δ ∈ Dm. By Theorem 1.3, this implies ap(n δ ) ∈ E for all δ ∈ Dm.
Proof 2
1. First, assume that default theory (∅ ∪ D, W ) has an extension E where
Ei where
Obviously then E = ∞ i=0 Ei where
defines an extension of (DN , W ∪ {ok(n1) ∧ · · · ∧ ok(n k )}).
Replacing W with W ′ in the above defines an extension of (DN , W ′ ∪ {ok(n1) ∧ · · · ∧ ok(n k )}) as well as of (DN ∪ DM ,
and
. Thus for this case we have that Sm((∅ ∪ D, W )) has extension E where E ∩ L = Th(W ∪ CON(D)).
(Note for this case that having bl(m) in our purported extension E ′ would contradict the assumption that D is a set of generating defaults for (∅ ∪ D, W ). 2. Assume that D is not a set of generating defaults for default theory (∅ ∪ D, W ). Thus for any set E and for
we have that E = ∞ i=0 Ei. In particular this holds for E = Th(W ∪ CON(D)). Since ∞ i=0 Ei = Th(W ∪ C) for some C ⊂ CON(D), this means that some default δj ∈ D fails to apply. There are two possibilities: (a) αj ∈ Ei for every i ≥ 0, or (b) ¬βj ∈ E. For the first case, assume that there is an extension E ′ of Sm((∅ ∪ D, W )) containing αj . Since αj ∈ W ′ \ W we have that W ∪ C ′ ⊢ αj for some C ′ ⊂ CON(D). Since W ⊢ αj contradicts αj ∈ Ei above, we have that C ′ = ∅ and hence ap(n) ∈ E ′ for some default n : δ. From Theorem 1.6 we obtain that {ap(n δ ) | δ ∈ D} ⊆ E ′ , hence in particular ap(nj ) ∈ E ′ and so αj ∈ GDi, a contradiction. Hence there is no extension 
A.2 Proofs for Section 4
We first show the following results:
1. By the consistency of E, we cannot have both m < m ′ ∈ E and
Then, however, the default rule
in D¬ is applicable and we obtain ¬(m < m ′ ) ∈ E, which contradicts our assumption. We have thus shown that m < m ′ ∈ E iff ¬(m < m ′ ) ∈ E. 2. Analogous to Proof 1.1.
Proof 2 1. Clearly, we have (m1 < m2) ∈ E if (m1 < m2) ∈ W ′ . Assume we have (m1 < m2) ∈ E and (m1 < m2) ∈ W ′ . Since (m1 < m2) ∈ W ′ = E0, there must exist (according to Definition 1) some i ≥ 0 with (m1 < m2) ∈ Ei but (m1 < m2) ∈ Ei+1. Since there are no default rules with consequents containing positive occurrences of <-literals, we must have (m1 < m2) ∈ Th(Ei) . For the same reason, all positive occurrences in Ei must stem from W<. In fact, all positive occurrences of <-literals in W< (in clause form) come from (16) or (18) in W<. For (16), we obtain (m1 < m2) ∈ W ′ , a contradiction. (18) can be written in the form ((m1 < m2) ∧ φ) ∨ ϕ ∨ ok(m1) for some formulas φ, ϕ. A proof for Ei ⊢ (m1 < m2) must thus contain the negative ok-literal ok(m1). There are however no negative occurrences of ok-literals in S((D, W, <)), neither in D ′ nor in W ′ , a contraction. 2. Analogous to proof of Lemma 2.1.
Proof 4
4+5+6. We show for all Dm ∈ 2 D by induction on < that ok(m) ∈ E iff bl(m) ∈ E or ap(m) ∈ E, and that ap(m) ∈ E iff ko(m) ∈ E, or ko(m) ∈ E iff (bl(m) ∈ E or ovr(m) ∈ E). Consider Dm ∈ 2 D and assume that for all D m ′ with Dm ⊂ D m ′ we have ok(m ′ ) ∈ E iff bl(m ′ ) ∈ W or ap(m ′ ) ∈ E, and ap(m ′ ) ∈ E iff ko(m ′ ) ∈ E, and ko(m) ∈ E iff (bl(m) ∈ E or ovr(m) ∈ E). First, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Given the induction hypothesis, we have ok(m)
-There is m ′ where m < m ′ ∈ E and ap(m ′ ) ∈ E. Because E is deductively closed and contains (21) we derive ovr(m) ∈ E, and ko(m) from (19). The only way in which ok(m) can be derived is via (18). bl(m ′ ) ∈ E by the induction hypothesis, and so we deduce that ok(m) ∈ E. -For every m ′ where m < m ′ ∈ E we have ap(m ′ ) ∈ E. We obtain that for every such m
For Dm = {δj | j = 1..k} ∈ 2 D , we distinguish the following cases.
ko(m) ∈ E. The latter implies bl(m) ∈ E. As a consequence, we get δ
∈ GD(D ′ , E) for j = 1..k. Since ok(m) ∈ E, we thus have for each δj ∈ {δ1, . . . , δ k } = Dm that
Furthermore, (31) implies ¬JUS(δj) ∈ E. With ∀y ∈ N. in(y, x) ⊃ ok(y·x) ∈ E and the fact that E is deductively closed, we get that (δj ) m,n a ∈ GD(D ′ , E) for j = 1..k. That is, since E is deductively closed, ap(nj ·m) ∈ E for j = 1..k. And from this we conclude by Theorem 1.6 that ap(m) ∈ E.
-If
The only other possibility is that ok(m) ∈ E. But then by Lemma 3 we would have that there is m ′ where m < m ′ and ap(m ′ ) ∈ E. But then, since E is deductively closed, we get ovr(m) ∈ E via (21) and so ko(m) ∈ E. Consequently we have ko(m) ∈ E. It follows that ap(m) ∈ E: Assume to the contrary that ap(m) ∈ E. ap(m) is derivable via (20) only. But this means that ap(nj ·m) ∈ E for every δj ∈ Dm; hence ok(nj·m) ∈ E for every δj ∈ Dm, or for in(nj , m). But ok(nj ·m) is obtainable only from application of the default
, contradiction.
A similar argument established that bl(m) ∈ E. This demonstrates that ok(m) ∈ E iff ap(m) ∈ E or bl(m) ∈ E, and that ap(m) ∈ E iff ko(m) ∈ E and that ko(m) ∈ E iff (bl(m) ∈ E or ovr(m) ∈ E) for all Dm ∈ 2 D . 3. This is a corollary of the preceding. 7. The if-part follows immediately from the last line in W< (21). For the only-if part, we observe that ovr(m) can be derived only from (21). 8. Assume that ap(m) ∈ E for some m and that for some m ′ where m < m ′ ∈ E we have bl(m ′ ) ∈ E. This means that ko(m ′ ) ∈ E since ko(m ′ ) ∈ E is derivable only by (19). ko(m ′ ) ∈ E implies ap(m) ∈ E (Theorem 4.5) and (from W<) we get ovr(m) ∈ E. But then ko(m) ∈ E and ap(m) ∈ E, ko(m) ∈ E contradicts Theorem 4.5. 9. This is obvious from (21). 10. Assume that ap(m), ap(m ′ ) ∈ E where (m < m ′ ) ∈ E. Since ap(m ′ ) ∈ E we have from (21) that ovr(m) ∈ E and ko(m) ∈ E. But ap(m) ∈ E, ko(m) ∈ E contradicts Theorem 4.5.
Proof 6 Let (D, W ) be a semi-monotonic default theory and let E be an extension of
. We make use of the following definition:
Assume that ap(m) ∈ E where m is the name of Dm. We show that ↓(T h(W ∪ CON(Dm)), m) is an extension of (D, W ). We have ok(m) ∈ E by Theorem 4.4. Let i be the least integer such that ok(m) ∈ Ei, and let j be the least integer such that ap(m) ∈ Ej. (That is, in the definition of an extension there is some step, i, where ok(m) is asserted. Following this the defaults corresponding to elements of Dm are applied. At (later) step j > i we are "done" applying the defaults and ap(m) is asserted.) Lemma 4. ↓(Ei, m) = Th(W ) for i as above. Proof 4 Since ap(m) ∈ Ej we have ap(m) ∈ E, and from Theorem 4.8 we get that bl(m ′ ) ∈ E for all m ′ such that m < m ′ . Thus ko(m ′ ) ∈ E. Thus for every m ′ where m < m ′ and for default δ l ∈ D m ′ we have ok(n l ·m ′ ) ∈ E (since the only way ok(n l ·m ′ ) can be inferred is from (9)). Hence default δ l isn't applied in E. Since this holds for arbitrary m ′ where m < m ′ , it follows that
Since ap(m) ∈ E, ko(m) ∈ E via Theorem 4.5, so (9) is applicable at step i + 1. We have:
Ej ⊆ Th(Ej−1) .
Observe that for k > j we have ↓(E k , m) = ↓(Ej, m) since the name m appears only in relation to the set Dm.
Define: E m k = ↓(E i+k+1 , m) for 0 ≤ k. For later use, we have the following small lemma.
Lemma 5.
We show that the sets E 
and in particular for k = 0 we have . We expand the right hand side of (32) using Definition 1 to obtain:
This together with Lemma 5 shows that ↓(E, m) satisfies the definition of an extension.
Proof 7
Define: for D1, D2 ⊆ D, D1 < D2 iff D1 ⊂ D2. Let (D, W ) be a semi-monotonic default theory with extensions E1, . . . , En. E (D, W ) = (D ′ , W ′ ) be given as in Definition 2. For ease of notation, let mi name ζ(GD(D, Ei)) for i = 1..n. Define in L + :
To begin with, we show that for mi naming a set of generating defaults of (D, W ) that
. Consequently for every α ∈ L, we have shown that α ∈ ↓(E ′ , mi) iff α ∈ Ei, hence ↓(E ′ , mi) = Ei. Second, for mi not a name of a set of generating defaults, it follows easily that
We show next that E ′ is an extension of E (D, W ) = (D ′ , W ′ ), and subsequently that for mi naming η(GD(D, Ei)) we have ap(mi) ∈ E ′ . To show that E ′ is an extension of (D ′ , W ′ ), we first show the following three propositions:
To show this, suppose PRE(δ) ∈ E ′ and ¬JUS(δ) ∈ E ′ . For brevity, we assume without further mention elementary results arising from deductively-closed sets. E.g. (and most frequently) α, β ∈ E ′ iff α ∧ β ∈ E ′ .
then we have (mi < mj) ∈ E ′ . The definition of E ′ and the fact that (mi < mj) ∈ E ′ implies that (mi < mj) ∈ W ′ , specifically (mi < mj) ∈ WM , and so (Di, Dj ) ∈ < . But from the definition of E ′ this means that ¬(mi < mj ) ∈ E ′ .
then we have in(ni, mj) ∈ E ′ . As in the preceding this implies that in(ni, mj) ∈ W ′ , and in particular that in(ni, mj) ∈ WM or δi ∈ Dj for Dj ⊆ D. Consequently, according to the definition of E ′ this means that ¬in(ni,
for δj ∈ Di and Di = {δ1, . . . , δ k } then ok(mi) ∈ E ′ and αj(mi) ∈ E ′ . Since ↓(E ′ , mi) = Ei for each extension Ei we get that Di is not a set of generating defaults for (D, W ). From the definition of E ′ we obtain that bl(mi) ∈ E ′ .
′ . For extension Ei, we note that {δ1, . . . , δ k } ⊆ GD(D, Ei), since if this were the case we would have CON(δ1), . . . , CON(δ k ) ∈ Ei, and this together with (γ1 ∧· · ·∧γ k ) ⊃ ¬βj and the fact that E is deductively closed means that ¬βj ∈ Ei for some default δj . But this means that ¬JUS(δj) ∈ Ei, contradicting the assumption that δj ∈ GD(D, Ei). So for Di = {δ1, . . . , δ k } we have Di ⊆ GD(D, Ei) for any extension Ei of (D, W ), and from the definition of E ′ we obtain that bl(mi) ∈ E ′ .
Hence from the definition of E ′ this means that Di = GD(D, E). In the definition of E ′ we have that for every δj ∈ GD(D, Ei) that ok(mi) ∈ E ′ . Hence for every δj ∈ Di we have that ok(nj ·mi) ∈ E ′ .
for δj ∈ D then we have α(m) ∧ in(n, m) ∧ ok(nj·m) ∈ E ′ and ¬β(m) ∈ E ′ . Since ok(nj ·m) ∈ E ′ , by construction of E ′ we have that there is extension Ei such that Dm = GD(D, Ei). Since ↓(E ′ , m) = Ei we have α ∈ Ei and ¬β ∈ Ei. Since Ei is an extension, we have that δj ∈ GD(D, Ei) and so from the definition of E ′ we obtain γ(m) ∧ ap(nj·m) ∈ E ′ .
This shows that for any
According to Definition 3, we get
To show the converse, we show that if µ ∈ E ′ then µ ∈ Γ (E ′ ). We distinguish the following cases.
-
again, since we have the default
-We claim that for all m ∈ M \ {mD}:
Γ (E ′ ) and ap(m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ), and for every δj ∈ Dm we have CON(δj )(m) ∧ ap(nj ·m), ok(nj ·m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ). 3. If Dm ⊂ GD(D, Ei) for some extension Ei then ovr(m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ).
Since the set of sets of generating defaults of extensions of (D, W ) forms a cut of the lattice of subsets of D, 1.-3. above covers all remaining cases. We show for all Dm ⊆ D that the claim holds by induction on <. Base: By definition, ok(mD) ∈ W< ⊆ W ′ ⊆ Γ (E ′ ).
We have the default
and since in(n ↑ , mD) ∈ Γ (E ′ ) we get ok(mD) ∈ Γ (E ′ ) and ko(mD) ∈ E ′ ; hence from Condition 3 of Definition 3 we obtain ok(n ↑ ·mD) ∈ Γ (E ′ ).
Similarly we have the default
. Since in(n ↑ , mD) ∧ ok(n ↑ ·mD) ∈ Γ (E ′ ), ¬⊤ ∈ E ′ , we obtain ap(n ↑ ·mD) ∈ Γ (E ′ ). Since Γ (E ′ ) is deductively closed we get ap(mD) ∈ Γ (E ′ ).
Step: Consider Dm ⊆ D and assume that for all Dj such that Dm < Dj that 1.-3. in the claim above hold. Let Dm = {δi, . . . , δ k }. There are the following cases.
1. There is extension Ei where GD(D, Ei) ⊂ Dm. By the induction hypothesis, and in particular 1., for every m ′ such that m < m ′ , we have bl(m ′ ) ∈ Γ (E ′ ) or m ′ = mD ∈ Γ (E ′ ). Since W< contains the formula ∀x ∈ M ∀y ∈ M. (x < y) ⊃ (bl(y) ∨ y = mD) ⊃ ok(x) and since Γ (E ′ ) is deductively closed, we have that ok(m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ). Observe that Dm is not a set of generating defaults of an extension E ′′ of (D, W ), since GD(D, Ei) ⊂ Dm would contradict the assumption that Ei is an extension of (D, W ). Since Dm is not a set of generating defaults of an extension, one of two cases hold. , via Definition 3 we get that bl(m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ). (b) For some δ ∈ Dm \ GD(D, Ei) we have W ∪ CON(GD(D, Ei)) ⊢ PRE(δ). Thus W (m) ∪ CON(GD(D, Ei))(m) ⊢ PRE(δ)(m), so W (m) ⊢ PRE(δ)(m) or, using (34) E ′ ⊢ PRE(δ)(m) or, since E ′ is logically closed, PRE(δ)(m) ∈ E ′ . Since for some δ ∈ Dm, say δ = δi, we have that PRE(δ) ∈ E ′ and since ok(m), in(nj , m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ) and since we have the rule in(n j ,m)∧ok(m) : ¬α j bl(m)
, via Definition 3 we obtain that bl(m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ).
Dm = GD(D, Ei).
First, we have bl(m) ∈ E ′ by definition of E ′ and similarly ovr(m) ∈ E ′ . By the induction hypothesis, and in particular 2., for every m ′ such that m < m ′ , we have bl(m ′ ) ∈ Γ (E ′ ) or m ′ = mD ∈ Γ (E ′ ). Since W< contains the formula ∀x ∈ M ∀y ∈ M. (x < y) ⊃ (bl(y) ∨ y = mD) ⊃ ok(x) and since Γ (E ′ ) is deductively closed, we have that ok(m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ). Since ok(m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ) and ovr(m) ∈ E ′ , so ko(m) ∈ E ′ . From we get ∀y ∈ N. in(y, m) ⊃ ok(y·m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ) via Definition 3.
Claim: First, for every δj ∈ Dm = GD(D, Ei) we have αj(m) ∧ in(nj , m) ∧ ok(nj·m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ) and ¬βj (m) ∈ E ′ . Second, since we have the rule α j (m)∧in(n j ,m)∧ok(n j ·m) : β j (m) γ j (m)∧ap(n j ·m)
we obtain via Definition 3 that γj(m) ∧ ap(nj) ∈ Γ (E ′ ). Proof of Claim: We have that GD(D, Ei) is a set of generating defaults of (D, E). The proof is by induction on the grounded enumeration δj j∈I of defaults in Dm = GD(D, Ei). Base: There is δ l :
∈ GD(D, E) such that α l ∈ W and ¬β l ∈ E. So α l (m) ∈ W ′ and since W ′ (m) ⊆ Γ (E ′ ) so α l (m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ). Also, since ok(n l ·m), in(n l , m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ), so α l (m) ∧ in(n l , m) ∧ ok(n l ·m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ). Also ¬β l (m) ∈ E ′ (since ↓(E ′ , m) = Ei and β l ∈ Ei). From Definition 3 we get that γ l (m) ∧ ap(n l ·m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ).
Step: Assume that the claim holds for 0..k.
We have some δ l ∈ GD(D, Ei) such that α l ∈ E k and ¬β l ∈ E (since we have a grounded enumeration of the defaults in GD(D, Ei)). By the induction hypothesis E k (m) ⊆ Γ (E ′ ) and so α l (m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ). We have ok(n l ·m), in(n l , m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ), hence α l (m) ∧ in(n l , m) ∧ ok(n l ·m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ). Also ¬β l (m) ∈ E ′ (since ↓(E ′ , m) = Ei and β l ∈ Ei). From Definition 3 we get that γ l (m) ∧ ap(n l ·m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ).
This takes care of the case where Dm = GD(D, Ei).
Dm ⊂ GD(D, Ei).
By the induction hypothesis we have that ap(mi) ∈ Γ (E ′ ). As well, m < mi ∈ W<. Since W< contains the formula ∀x, y ∈ M. ap(x) ⊃ (y < x ⊃ ovr(y)) and W< ⊆ Γ (E ′ ), and Γ (E ′ ) is logically closed we get ovr(m) ∈ Γ (E ′ ). We have thus shown that µ ∈ E ′ implies µ ∈ Γ (E ′ ). Since both E ′ and Γ (E ′ ) are deductively closed, we get that E ′ ⊆ Γ (E ′ ).
